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Abstract. This paper explores the role of human capital on earn-
ings and other measures of job performance during the late 19th
century. During this time, U.S. Naval ocers belonged either to
a regular or an engineer corps and had tasks assigned to their
specialized training and experience. To test for the eects of spe-
cialized skills on performance, we compile educational data from
original-source Naval Academy records for the graduating classes
of 1858 to 1905. We merge these with career data extracted from
ocial Navy registers for the years 1859 to 1907. This compilation
comprises one of the longest and earliest longitudinal records of
labor market earnings, education and experience of which we are
aware. Our results suggest that greater technical skill translated
into higher earnings early in careers, but wage premia diminished
as careers progressed. From this evidence we argue that technical
progress was more skill-depreciating than skill-biased during this
period.
 Keywords: naval history, human capital, skill premium
 JEL Codes: J24, N31, N41, N71, O33
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This paper explores the role of ability and technical skill in ocer
performance in the United States Navy during the latter half of the
nineteenth century.
1 This period is a critical juncture in our economic
history, for many modern skill-intensive technologies can trace their
roots to the turn of the 20th century (see for example Mokyr 1990,
2002; O'Rourke et al 2008). Understanding the Industrial Revolution
and economic growth in history requires us to understand the inter-
actions between human capital and technological change. In order to
link the past with the present, theories of industrialization and \uni-
ed growth" make assumptions concerning the eects of the current
technological system (A) on human capital h (so that h = f(A)) as
well as the eects of human capital on subsequent technological change
(so that
_ A
A = g(h)) (Galor 2009; Galor and Weil 2000; Galor and Moav
2000). Without careful empirical study, we can only speculate over
these relationships, and ascribe functional forms to f and g in an ad
hoc manner.
Yet our knowledge of this period is limited; individual-level data col-
lected consistently over time are typically not available for any period
prior to the second half of the twentieth century.2 Arguably then, this
is a great arena to explore the historic role of technical skill, for navies
are both excellent indicators and creators of a nation's economic and
technological capabilities.
Navies have always been one of the vanguards of technological progress
(O'Brien 2001). But technical \progress" during the latter 19th cen-
tury posed particular challenges for the Navy. Innovations in propul-
sion, hull construction, and ordnance had the potential to erode the
1Many thanks to the participants of the 2009 Economic History Society meeting
at the University of Warwick and internal workshops at the U.S. Naval Academy
for their insights. Errors are strictly our own. Comments are always welcome.
2The earliest example of a study linking individual schooling and experience
data of which we are aware comes from the Iowa State Census of 1915, skillfully
exploited by Goldin and Katz 2000. Aldrich 1970 has a very interesting study that
tracks the earnings of West Point graduates during the ante-bellum period, but not
their educational pro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relevance of the skills of ocers educated and trained under a former
technological paradigm. As is true today, ocers of the 19th century
derived their professional worth in part from their education of partic-
ular naval \systems." The general-purpose nature of naval technology
meant that changes could radically depreciate the specialized human
capital of these ocers. The technological skepticism that naval of-
cers have historically expressed was plausibly a by-product of this
depreciation (McBride 2000).
But was such skepticism justied? The analysis of the naval profes-
sion during the latter 19th century aords us a unique opportunity to
gauge the eects of dramatic and uncertain technological changes in a
specic labor market. During this time ocers, belonging either in a
regular corps or an engineer corp, had fairly specialized tasks. So we
ask a number of questions. Did specialized technical skills correlate
with naval career success? Did ocers with specialized engineering
training and skill fare better than ocers with more general training?
And did success deteriorate over time?
We analyze the relationship between skill and performance by com-
piling data on naval ocers documented in the U.S. Navy registries.
These registry books, arranged in annual volumes, chart the rank, sta-
tion and pay of every serving naval ocer over time. We match this
data with the scores these ocers earned in dierent subjects as stu-
dents at the Naval Academy (compiled in the Naval Academy registers)
as well as data tracking the characteristics and stations of the ght-
ing ships to which each ocer is ultimately assigned each year. The
nal merged longitudinal dataset provides us one of the earliest exam-
ples of detailed individual measures of education, experience and work
performance of which we are aware. Furthermore, while studied and
discussed extensively by naval historians, this data has hitherto never
been codied, and thus has never been systematically studied.
We proxy for ocer job performance by alternatively using measures
of individual earned wage proles and durations of naval service. Our4 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
empirical exercises uncover a number of results concerning the eects
of skill on ocer careers. First, those with engineering skill tend to
leave the service earlier than those without. This is true either when
we measure skill extensively (comparing engineer ocers with regular
line ocers) or intensively (comparing line ocers with varying en-
gineering ability). On the other hand, technically skilled individuals
(again measured either extensively or intensively) earn higher wages
early on, but these premia diminish as time goes on. Taken together,
naval technical progress appears to be more technical-skill depreciating
rather than technical-skill augmenting. The more technically skilled
ocers earned a lower premium for their skills over time, and they
tended to leave the service with greater speed.
Finally, we analyze the eects of skill on dierent types of work ex-
perience. We nd evidence that technically skilled ocers worked more
often on shore, and less at sea. This implies that the more technically
gifted ocers worked more as technocrats in bureau jobs rather than
actual practitioners \in the eld." One lesson from this may be that
capital-skill complementarities, characteristic of the second Industrial
Revolution in general and certainly of the Navy, need not mean that
these factors worked closely or directly together.
The next section of the paper discusses the historic background in
more detail. We then describe the data we have collected and some
of the empirical tests we have performed, and present our econometric
results.
1. Background
1.1. A Navy in Transition. Like most industries of the time, the
19th century navy underwent dramatic, sometimes wrenching, science-
based technological changes that aected nearly facet of the industry.
Developments in steam propulsion, metallurgy, and naval ordnance
transformed the very nature of naval professional life. The question
of whether or not \skilled" workers benetted more from such changesVALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 5
is however ultimately an empirical one, for upon cursory inspection the
answer does not immediately surface.
On the one hand, technical skill in engineering would appear to mat-
ter greatly in the U.S. postbellum navy. The maintenance of blockades
during the Civil War seems to owe much of its eectiveness to naval
engineers (Davis and Engerman 2006). The growing reliance on steam
power for the propulsion of naval vessels was evident even before the
war - in November 1860 Congress announced its plans to convert seven
of the navy's sailing ships to steam power, at a cost of $3,064,000
(Sweetman 1984). Furthermore England, the paragon of all things
naval, was rapidly transforming its navy into one propelled predomi-
nantly by steam (Bennett 1896). These and other factors would seem to
indicate that technical progress in the U.S. navy would be skill-biased -
that is, it would raise the wages of ocers skilled in engineering relative
to their unskilled counterparts as the U.S. modernized its 
eet.3
Yet there were a number of factors that appear to work against
the exponents of technical progress. By the end of its civil war, the
United States had one of the most powerful and technologically ad-
vanced navies in the world. In 1865 the northern states maintained
671 modern war vessels, including 559 steam-powered ships and 71
ironclads (Coletta 1987). But the naval build-up during the war sub-
sequently led to a heated and often paralyzing debate over the future
course of the navy after the war. The ocer core and Congress were
divided over virtually everything; questions over general naval strategy,
proper building materials for ships, proper metals for gun construction,
and the appropriate method of propulsion consumed naval dialectics
for decades, leaving new entrants into the corps highly uncertain as to
which path the navy would ultimately take.
3See for example Griliches 1956, Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987, and Goldin and
Katz 1998 for micro estimates of the wage eects of skill-biased technological
change.6 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
No debate was more heated than the one over steam versus sail
power. The wartime steam-powered ship buildup triggered a renewed
debate between the traditionalists reared in the age of sail and the
disciples of newer technologies. Consequently the post-war naval pro-
fession was lled with anti-steam reactionaries.4 This backlash within
the service against both steam engines and the engineers who ran them
no doubt arose partly from line ocers' fears of becoming obsoleted by
a new technological system. Ocers in the old sailing navy controlled
both the weapons and the means of propulsion; in contrast the latter
19th-century navy required ocers to rely on mechanics, thus subor-
dinating their role in core operations to a \non-aristocratic" engineer
corps (McBride 2000).
Such divisiveness between engineers and line ocers must have un-
dermined to some extent the perceived value of engineers, and surely
created a great deal of uncertainty over the future path of the navy.
In 1869 the Navy Department directed the return of full sail power for
all ships, surely heightening the insecurity faced by all naval personnel
concerning their future fortunes (Coletta 1987). After this an awkward
compromise resulted in new war vessels being equipped with both sail
and steam rigging, provoking Rear Admiral Thorton A. Jenkins to
proclaim the 
eet to be a \heterogenous mass of naval incongruity
miscalled a navy" (Scott 1986). This not only muddled the optimal
mix of skills on which ocers could rely to succeed in the navy, but it
also served to further delay the navy's full transition to steam power.
Until sail power was completely phased out, shipbuilders were forced
to design vessels that would accommodate two incompatible propul-
sion systems, and ocers were forced to familiarize themselves with
both. Indeed, this slow transition from sail to steam was not truly
completed until the end of the century. The \ABCD" ships of 1883
(the Atlanta, Boston, Chicago and Dolphin), trumpeted for their steel
hulls and steam-powered propulsion systems as technological marvels
4See Morison 1966, Calvert 1967, Buhl 1974, and Albion 1980 for greater
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and harbingers of a modernizing 
eet, still incorporated traditional sail
rigs. Even the USS Texas and USS Maine, commissioned in 1895 as
the nation's rst modern battleships, were designed to carry sails in or-
der to complement their steam engines and extend their cruising radii
(McBride 1992).
A related area of technological uncertainty was the advance in met-
allurgy that allowed the transition from wood to metal ships. Again,
a smooth transition was thwarted by internal debate among top naval
brass. Admiral David Porter and Commodore T. H. Patterson advo-
cated the construction of many kinds of ships, but especially seagoing
ironclads. On the other hand, Rear Admirals Thornton Jenkins and
Louis Goldborough felt that such heavy armor would make ships un-
gainly, unwieldy, and prone to destruction by high speed armored rams.
Better they thought to build wooden ships with single-cycle engines
(Scott 1986). Adding to the damage caused by the uncertainties over
technological adoption was the fact that most Civil War ships had been
built of unseasoned timber, and so were prone to rapid deteriorization
during the late 1860s and 1870s (Coletta 1987).
By the early 1870s the total number of ships fell to 52, with these
mounting fewer than ve hundred mostly obsolete guns (Coletta 1987).
By 1880 there could be little doubt among members of the naval pro-
fession of the sad state of the U.S. Navy compared to her European
counterparts. What was still lacking however was any consensus on the
proper technological path on which to take the navy to the twentieth
century. Naval technologies in general were undergoing such violent
and rapid changes that few experts could advocate with any certainty
what course the navy should ultimately take. This directly hindered the
ability of naval constructors to design and build new warships, and thus
hindered the navy's ability to properly train and educate new troops of
future ocers. Part of the problem was Congress, which was unwilling
to spend money on guns and warships that would likely be obsoleted
in a short period of time (Scott 1986). On the other hand, many8 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
other congressional leaders and their constituents held the antitheti-
cal but equally misguided viewpoint that the 
eet consisted of highly
durable and long-lasting vessels. John Ericsson, himself a celebrated
naval engineer, proclaimed that \vessels like the monitors are good for
fty years." Such \false but soothing" advice failed to acknowledge
that technological change demanded constant military modernization
(Roberts 2002).
The U.S. Navy hit the nadir of its fortunes in the early 1880s. By
then the continual in
ow of Naval Academy graduates with very little
new naval construction created the dire situation where it took Annapo-
lis graduates as long as eight years to make ensign (Sweetman 1979).5
Congress's rather blunt solution to this imbalance was the Personnel
Act of 1882, which stipulated that the number of ocers annually com-
missioned could be no greater than the number of vacancies that had
opened up in the previous year. Those who were chosen to be com-
missioned were picked on the basis of class standing. Those who were
not received a diploma, a severance package of $950, and an honorable
discharge. Here was a stark example of what terrible consequences the
lack of good overall scores in college could bring - of the 305 Acad-
emy graduates from 1882 to 1887, only 136 remained past their second
year of service. Although it is impossible to know exactly who among
these were directly aected by the act and who merely \were driven
out of the service by the discouraging outlook,"6 the act served as a
reminder of the uncertainties inherent in a profession under wrenching
transition. Of course this imbalance also aected those from earlier
graduating classes - the top twelve graduates of the Class of 1868, for
example, had made lieutenant by 1872, but were destined to remain
lieutenants7 until 1893.
Despite the continued debates over the future course of the navy
among naval and congressional leaders, nearly every naval budget from
5Ensign is the lowest rank for a naval ocer, ranking just ahead of midshipman.
6NY Times article, December 7, 1892
7Lieutenant is the third lowest rank for a naval ocer.VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 9
1884 to the turn of the century included funds for new construction.
And with the resumption of naval construction came the eventual re-
peal of the Personnel Act in 1889. Although technological uncertainties
in propulsion (sail versus steam), armor (wood versus iron versus steel)
and ordnance (development of explosive shells and large breech-loading
ri
ed guns) continued into the twentieth century, rival navies' continual
innovations in design and engineering spurred the U.S. to do likewise.
The import of this narrative is to highlight the incertitude of naval
progress during the latter 19th century. Technical skill embodied in
ocers could conceivably deteriorate over time in such an environ-
ment. The general-purpose nature of technology in the navy meant
that changes would radically alter the relevant mix of skills useful for
career success. And the uncertainty concerning such changes would
conceivably bias naval education towards the status quo, limiting the
ability of ocers to succeed over time even further.
1.2. Naval Education and The Pre-Amalgamated Line. During
the latter half of the 19th century nearly every new ocer in the navy
was a graduate of the Naval Academy. Always striving to be a mir-
ror of the navy itself, the academy sought to design a curriculum with
the express technological and personnel needs of the naval profession.
With such uncertainties over the future course of the navy this mission
proved to be fairly dicult. Particularly challenging was calibrating
the proper mix of technical engineering courses with traditional sea-
manship and navigation training. Divisiveness between engineers and
line ocers in the service began to form during the Civil War, and
this naturally colored the academy's decisions concerning its curricu-
lum. The primary debate was over the question of whether all ocers
needed to be engineers as well as sailors, or whether a certain amount of
specialization could take place between engineer and line ocers. Pro-
ponents of the former approach included Secretary of the Navy Gideon
Wells, who back in 1863 rhetorically asked \whether every ocer of the
line ought not to be educated to and capable of performing the duties10 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
that devolve upon engineers."8 But line ocers resented the intrusion
of engineers into their spheres of in
uence, preferring them to serve be-
low deck as they traditionally did, out of sight and out of mind. Even
Alfred Mahan, the celebrated champion of the big and technologically
sophisticated navy, dismissed the engineer corps as \those who snored
away below while line ocers fought the ship" (McBride 2000). Oth-
ers referred derisively to engineers as \wipers" and \greasers" (Coletta
1987).
Still, the view that technical training for all ocers was of critical
importance for the modernization of the 
eet held rmly in the minds
of many. The Department of Steam Enginery was developed by Ad-
miral Porter, Superintendent of the academy, to attempt to make all
future ocers engineers as well. Blocks of academic time were set aside
for engineering instruction, and during the summer cruise of 1866 the
midshipmen alternated watches between the engine room and on deck.
But any dispassionate survey of the program would have to deem it an
utter failure from the start. The midshipmen showed very little interest
in the engineering courses, and their engineering performance on cruise
was so abysmal that the approach was altogether abandoned. Steam
stayed in the curriculum, but the academy made no subsequent at-
tempts at qualifying all the midshipmen as engineers (Sweetman 1979).
As a result both of this failed experiment and of the tensions among
traditional ocers and engineers, a heterogenous ocer core emerged,
where line ocers and engineer ocers performed mostly separate func-
tions aboard war vessels and in the service in general. In order to ac-
commodate this specialization among personnel, the Naval Academy
developed a separate corps of cadet engineers who were instructed sep-
arately from the other midshipmen during the last two years of their
studies. There were three phases during the 19th century when this
was attempted. In 1868, sixteen cadets were appointed acting third
assistant engineers and began a two-year engineer-oriented course of
8Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy 1863.VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 11
study. This program was discontinued after one year, but a new group
of cadet engineers was subsequently admitted. In March 1871 Congress
directed that at the discretion of the president members of the corps
be given relative rank to line ocers. From 1872 until 1882 the acad-
emy consistently graduated engineer ocers along with line ocers.
The Personnel Act discontinued this separate line of training, but it
was resumed with the act's repeal, and so from 1894 to 1899 the acad-
emy continued to graduate and commission engineer ocers. Finally
came the Amalgamation Act of 1899, whereby engineer ocers were
absorbed into a new \amalgamated" line. Thereafter all newly minted
ocers were allegedly skilled enough to perform any task aboard any
vessel. This shift in organizational strategy was prompted by a study
made under the auspices of Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore
Roosevelt. This amalgamation ostensibly eliminated the independent
corps of line and engineer ocers, for according to Roosevelt \on the
modern war vessel, every ocer has to be an engineer whether he wants
to or not" (McBride 2000).
2. The Evolving Value of Human Capital in the Navy
2.1. Framework for Evaluating the Value of Human Capital.
The tumult of the technological revolutions during the second Indus-
trial Revolution is in many ways epitomized by the U.S. Navy. Tech-
nical training was clearly important in accessing and using the new
technologies, but without the continual updating of one's skills such
training could face rapid depreciation over time. Given individual-
level evidence for both the regular corps and the engineer corps, the
19th century navy oers us a unique industry case study to gauge the
value of skills during this period. How valuable were they, and how did
their value change over time?
These questions should be of particular interest to those who study
the interactions between human capital and technology in history. Stud-
ies concerning this period of our economic history usually treat human12 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
capital as a binary measure; in this context, an engineer ocer would
be considered a \skilled" worker while a line ocer would be consid-
ered an \unskilled" worker. But this approach misses some potential
interactions between technology and human capital that we know to be
of historic importance, at least in the context of the 19-century navy.
First, it treats ocers as two monolithic groups, when in fact each o-
cer would have their own unique mix of skills which they would employ
in the service. Technological change then could aect each ocer dif-
ferently, depending on his mix of skills. As a simple example, suppose
human capital can be divided into two types, general human capital
(hG), and specialized human capital (hS). hG refers to general intelli-
gence or education not specic to any one subject or type of training;
hS on the other hand refers to human capital for use in a specic pro-
duction process or subject area. Human capital for individual i at time
t might then be characterized as:
Hi;t = (1   gt)h
G
i + (1   gt)h
S
i
where gt denotes technical progress in the industry, and , and  are
parameters which describe how technical progress aect dierent types
of human capital. Such a description of human capital where  > 0
and/or  > 0 echoes discussions in Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor
and Moav (2000), who suggest that at least a portion of human capital
dissolves away with technical progress. In the context here, we suggest
that ocer's set of technical skills can erode with technological change,
potentially at dierent rates. This points to the possibility of tech-
nological change as having a general purpose component to it, where
technical progress can aect the entire economic system in such a way
as to render certain skills obsolete. Indeed, the switch from sail-power
to steam-power in maritime and naval activities has often been char-
acterized in precisely this way (see Aghion and Howitt 1998, chapter
8, for a fuller theoretical discussion).VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 13
On the other hand, certain skills can become more valuable as tech-
nical progress occurs (in this case  < 0 and/or  < 0). The idea
that general education and skills can help in coping with technologi-
cal change dates back to at least Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Welch
(1970), who suggest that education can yield higher returns in an en-
vironment with more rapid technological growth. Changes in this case
would appear to be skill-biased. More recent studies such as Krueger
and Kumar (2004) suggest that only workers with general education
can operate new, risky technologies, whereas workers without this gen-
eral education are relatively more eective in operating old, established
technologies.
Thus whether or not technological progress is more skill-augmenting
or skill-depreciating is ultimately an empirical question. Much will de-
pend on the industry and the types of technological changes occurring
within the industry. Figure 1 illustrates how the value of human capital
may change over time in the context of the 19th century navy. Here the
suggestion is that the more skilled worker will earn a higher wage ini-
tially than his relatively unskilled counterpart. With skill-depreciation,
however, this wage dierential will narrow over time.
This would suggest that technical change is more skill-depreciating
than skill-augmenting; as intuitive as this possibility is, however, it need
not be true in reality. Technical change in the navy during the late 19th
century (switching from sail to steam technology, from wooden hulls to
iron hulls to steel hulls, from many small-caliber guns to a few large-
caliber guns, and so forth) could be expected to change the demand
for \skilled" labor in several often countervailing ways. What kinds of
skills thrived in this environment is the question to which we now turn.
2.2. Empirical Strategy. Our basic empirical strategy is to test the
eects of education and experience on measures of career success within
a stylized Mincerian framework. We have two basic proxies for \job14 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY















performance" - the length of service an ocer has in the Navy (du-
ration),9 and the wages an ocer earns over a certain period of time
9Unfortunately we are unable to track workers once they leave the Navy.VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 15
(earnings). Each proxy in turn requires two specications - one that
includes our extensive measure of skill (engineer ocer versus not),
and one that includes our intensive measures of skill (scores that line
ocers receive in various subjects).
For our analysis of career lengths, we run the following specications:
(1) durationi = 0 + 1meriti + 2engineeringi +
1diesi + class + "i
(2) durationi = 0 + 1meriti + 2steami + 3seamanshipi +
4ordnancei + 5navigationi + 1diesi + class + "i
where durationi is the number of years ocer i is in the service, meriti
is a measure of his general order of merit, engineeringi is an indicator
variable equalling one if ocer i is an engineer ocer, and diesi is
an indicator variable equalling one if ocer i dies while in service.
The variables steami, seamanshipi, ordnancei and navigationi are all
scores which line ocers receive in particular subject areas as cadets in
school. Equation (1) thus allows us to see how our extensive measure of
education aects duration of service, while equation (2) allows us to see
how intensive measures of education aect duration of service. Finally,
we include dummies for each graduating class of the Naval Academy.
Because the fortunes of each graduation class varied dramatically (due
to appropriation dierences year to year, number of vessels year to
year, and so forth), this is potentially an important control to include.
For our wage analysis, we run the following:
(3) ln (earnings)i;rs = 0 + 1meriti + 2engineeringi +16 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
1cum:ship:expi;r + 2cum:sea:expi;r + class + "i
ln (earnings)i;rs = 0 + 1meriti + 2steami + 3seamanshipi +
(4) 4ordnancei + 5navigationi + 1cum:ship:expi;r +
2cum:sea:expi;r + class + "i





Here r is the chosen starting year and s is the chosen nal year
of ocer i's wage history. The dependent variable is thus simply a
summation of annual wages for a pre-chosen period of time. To capture
some measure of \work experience," we include the number of years
(out of a total of r years) ocer i spends assigned to a naval vessel
(given by cum:ship:expi;r), and the number of years he spends assigned
to a vessel that is out at sea (as opposed to a vessel dry docked or
out of commission, given by cum:sea:expi;r) Here we also include the
same extensive and intensive measures of skill as before, as well as
graduating-class dummies.
One thing to point out is that for this exercise we can only count
those ocers who actually serve up to year s. If many ocers leave the
service before that point, a selection issue arises that biases results. To
check for the robustness of results to selection issues, we alternatively
produce Heckit estimates.10 For example, if (3) is our equation of







10This approach comes from the classic Heckman 1976 paper.VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 17

3sicki;s + 
4leavei;s + class + i
where zi;s is an indicator variable equalling one if ocer i remains in
service after at least s years, sicki;s is an indicator variable equalling
one if ocer i had ever been sick or received naval hospital treatment
any time up to year s of his career, and leavei;s is an indicator variable
equalling one if ocer i had ever been on a leave of absence any time up
to year s of his career. The sample rule is that earningsi;rs is observed
only when z
i;s is one. Similarly, if (4) is our equation of primary interest,














Ultimately these lead to estimates for the conditional expectations
E

ln (earnings)i;rs jzi;s = 1

= 0 + 1meriti +





ln (earnings)i;rs jzi;s = 1

= 0 + 1meriti +
(8) 2steami + 1cum:ship:expi;r + 2cum:sea:expi;r +
class + i
where i is the inverse Mills ratio generated from (5) or (6). Note
that while (6) includes all subjects, (8) only includes steam. This is
to isolate the eects of engineering skill on ocer's earnings, using all
subjects to model the sample selection mechanism.11
11As we will see in the results section, other subjects besides steam do not
signicantly aects earnings, but can signicantly aect the length of one's service,
making them ideal for inclusion in (6).18 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
Another thing to note is that we use a summation of wages over
a period of time as one of our dependent variables, as opposed to a
single wage typical of Mincerian-type regressions. The main reason
for this is that pay dierences among ocers are primarily a function
of dierent occupations and ranks. The \schedule" of pay among the
dierent ranks, however, remained remarkably consistent through the
period we are analyzing. Table 1 provides a portion of the schedule of
the annual wages paid to line ocers and engineer ocers during the
late-19th century.
12
This pay depended on the rank of the ocer, the length of time he
has been at that rank, and his duty (broadly classied as \at sea," \on
shore duty" and \on leave or waiting orders"). In order to construct
earnings proles, we match each ocer's rank and duty station to the
appropriate wage, constructing a time series of annual wages partic-
ular to each ocer. To create a career earnings measure that varies
among the ocers, we aggregate these wages across time, ultimately
capturing year to year variation in jobs, ranks, experience, and respon-
sibilities (e.g. command). If the ocer serves on a vessel during a
particular year, we cross reference information on the ship to which
he was assigned - if the ship is dry-docked, in ordnance, or otherwise
incapable of being launched for sea service, we allocate shore duty pay
for the ocer.
Finally, by changing r and s, we can gauge changes in the rela-
tionship between human capital and earnings over the course of one's
career. If changes in the navy are skill-augmenting, we can expect a
stronger relationship between education and earnings as those earnings
are measured further into the future. On the other hand, if changes
tend to depreciate existing skills, we can expect a weaker relationship
between education and earnings measured over greater lengths of time.
12Other more nontraditional positions not reported in the table include the var-
ious ranks for marines, paymasters, naval constructors, and even professors (these
were typically instructors at the Naval Academy). These positions also had specic
pay schedules that varied according to rank and length of tenure.VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 19
Table 1. Summary Statistics from Naval Academy and
U.S. Navy Registers
   
   
Number of academy graduates (1858 – 1905)  2,376 
  
Number of cadet engineers (1868 – 1899) 252 
  
Average graduating class size   49.2 
       1860s  55.1 
       1870s         49.5 
       1880s  50.1 




Annual Wages for Selected Naval Officers and Personnel,  
                                 1899 U.S. Dollars 
  at sea  on shore 
duty 
on leave or 
waiting 
orders 
Rear Admiral   6000 5000  4000 
Captain 4500  3500  2800 
Commander 3500  3000  2300 
Lieutenant Commander       
    first 4 years  2800  2400  2000 
    after 4 years  3000  2600  2200 
Lieutenant      
    first 5 years  2400  2000  1600 
    after 5 years  2600  2200  1800 
Lieutenant, junior grade (Master)       
    first 5 years  1800  1500  1200 
    after 5 years  2000  1700  1400 
Ensign      
    first 5 years  1200  1000  800 
    after 5 years  1400  1200  1000 
Cadet 500  500  500 
      
Chief Engineer       
    first 5 years      2800  2400  2000 
    second 5 years  3200  2800  2400 
    third 5 years 3500  3200  2600 
    fourth 5 years 3700  3600  2800 
Passed Assistant Engineer       
    first 5 years  2000  1800  1500 
    second 5 years  2200  2000  1700 
    third 5 years 2450  2250  1900 
    fourth 5 years 2700  2350  1950 
Assistant Engineer       
    first 5 years  1700  1400  1000 
    after 5 years  1900  1600  1200 
3. Data
We use data on naval ocers compiled by the Navy Register and
housed in the National Archives. Arranged by year, each volume con-
tains the names of ocers, their rank, and their duty or station. This20 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
information was compiled by the navy at the beginning of each year
(typically January or February). For regular ocers, ranks range from
admiral13 to cadet or midshipman. For engineer ocers, ranks range
from chief engineer to cadet engineer. Figure 2 illustrates the number
of ocers we track through these registers, arranged by class year.
Each navy register also maintains a list of active naval vessels, their
present duty or station, and basic ship characteristics such as rate,
number of guns and displacement. For each ocer serving aboard a
particular vessel we cross reference these ship characteristics. This al-
lows us to determine on what kinds of vessels the ocer served, and if
he was in fact out to sea as opposed to serving on a docked or uncom-
missioned vessel. Ocer assignments and ship duties changed quite
frequently, which introduces a great deal of job heterogeneity into ca-
reer paths and demonstrates how the Navy consistently moved ocers
into new duties, presumably at least in part due to dierences in human
capital and performance. Hence, higher ability and better performance
ideally landed ocers in preferable jobs that over the course of careers
translated into higher earnings.
In order to construct earnings proles for each ocer, we combine
both sets of data. Specically, we match each ocer's rank and duty
station to the appropriate wage, constructing a time series of annual
wages particular to each ocer. If the ocer served on a vessel during
a particular year, we cross reference information on the ship to which
he was assigned - if the ship is dry-docked, in ordinary, or otherwise
incapable of being launched for sea service, we allocate shore duty pay
for the ocer.
Figure 3 illustrates the average earnings for certain graduating classes
over time, both for regular ocers and engineering ocers. As is clear
from the gure, the economic fortunes of each ocer were highly sen-
sitive to which graduating class he belonged. A graduate of the class
13George Dewey of the class of 1858 is the only member in our data to make the
rank of admiral.VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 21














































of 1870 for example faced a crippling decline in commissioned war ves-
sels, and so found his chances of promotion limited. A graduate of the
class of 1890 on the other hand was fortunate to have a career during
what now we can call a \naval renaissance." Further, each class faced22 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
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a dierent curriculum from the Naval Academy, and so each class dif-
fered somewhat in education and training. Because of this dramaticVALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 23
heterogeneity, we include graduating class dummies for all our econo-
metric specications. Inclusion of class dummies allows us to compare
the eects of education on career success for ocers within the same
graduating class, and helps isolate the eects of various educational
measures on performance.
We match merge this data on ocer performance to the Naval Acad-
emy records of each ocer. These records, housed in the Naval Acad-
emy archives, document each midshipman's overall order of merit rank
for his particular class, as well as orders of merit according to a va-
riety of specic subjects. For overall order of merit, we compile both
freshman-year merit scores (arguably a measure of more general ability
as freshman classes tended to be less navy-specic and more generally
academic, with classes like basic math and science, English and com-
position) and nal-year (the end of four years) merit scores. Engineer
cadets were ranked along with regular cadets during their freshman
year (since both groups took the same classes during their rst year);
during their nal year however engineer cadets were ranked as a sepa-
rate group. For each ocer i the score is dened as
meriti = 1  
classrank
classsize
so that scores are scaled from zero (bottom of the class) to one (top of
the class).14
14One issue we face in compiling specic subject information is the lack of exact
comparability across all subjects and graduating classes. For example, four-year
scores on History and Composition, Grammar, Rhetoric and Drawing only exist
for the classes 1871 and 1872. Fencing was apparently deemed an unnecessary
skill for eective naval service and eliminated as a required course after 1875. Fur-
ther, courses were often changed around and renamed (for example, a "navigation"
course could be labeled "practical navigation," or "navigation and surveying," or
even "astronomy and navigation"). We choose four primary subjects to include
in our specications, both for their high comparability across class years and for
their potential relevance for eective naval service. As made explicit in regressions24 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
The nal data set maintains the educational prole of every grad-
uating ocer from the academy from 1858 to 1905, and information
concerning their service in the navy from 1859 to 1907.15 This is the
earliest example of matched education-work experience data at the in-
dividual level in any industry of which we are aware, and provides us a
glimpse into an industry undergoing rapid and uncertain technological
change during the latter 19th century.
Finally, we include controls for human capital while on the job.
These are given by cumulative ship experience and cumulative blue
water (or sea) experience. If an ocer spends a year aboard ships nav-
igating aborad in international waters, his cumulative sea experience
rises. On the other hand, if he serves aboard a dry-docked vessel, or
on a vessel that is part of the \brown water" navy (a coastal vessel),
he increases his cumulative ship experience without increasing his sea
experience. In this way we can control for dierent types of naval expe-
rience that may or may not be important to one's earnings potential.
4. Results
4.1. Human capital eects on duration. We rst test the length
of one's service in the navy, independent of earnings, by regressing the
number of years of service on measures of skill and ability. This requires
right-censored regressions, as we have navy register information only
up to 1907, while many ocers in our dataset serve in the navy well
beyond that point.16
(2) and (4), these are \steam," \seamanship," \navigation" and \ordnance and
gunnery."
151858 is the earliest class for which we could nd information; our decision to
end at 1907 is essentially arbitrary.
16For the graduates of the class of 1904, for example, the dependent variable can
take values of 1 or 2 (the uncensored cases) or 3 (the censored case). Thus censored
points will be class-dependent. The ocer graduating in 1904 who lasts for at three
years is thus top coded.VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 25
Table 2. Right-Censored Regression Estimates of Ef-




  1 2 3 4 
Overall Relative Merit  8.2***  7.4***  --  -- 
 (1.2)  (1.6)     
        
First Year Relative  --  0.3  --  1.6 
Merit   (1.6)    (1.7) 
        
Relative Steam  --  --  -3.5*  -4.1** 
     (1.9)  (2.0) 
Relative Seamanship  --  --  4.7**  4.7** 
     (1.9)  (2.0) 
Relative Navigation  --  --  8.3***  8.1*** 
   (2.1)  (2.3) 
Relative Ordnance  --  --  2.9  1.8 
     (2.4)  (2.5) 
Engineer (dummy)  -0.4  -0.29  --  -- 
 (1.2)  (1.4)     
        
Dies in service   -8.6*** -9.9***  -8.6***  -9.9*** 
(dummy) (1.1)  (1.2)  (1.3)  (1.4) 
        
pseudo R – squared  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04 
        
Number of Obs.  2361  2179  1765  1665 
        
Number of Right   1095  1070  892  886 
Censored Obs.         
        
Dependent variable is number of years of naval officer’s career (up to 1907).  
Constant and class dummies not reported. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by  
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Table 3. Right-Censored Regression Estimates of Ef-
fects of Skill and Ability on Duration of Naval Career
(All Personnel Who Serve at Least Three Years)
 
 
  1 2 3 4 
Overall Relative Merit  1.9  1.4  --  -- 
 (1.4)  (1.8)     
        
First Year Relative  --  -0.7  --  -1.3 
Merit   (1.8)    (2.1) 
        
Relative Steam  --  --  -4.9**  -5.8** 
     (2.4)  (2.6) 
Relative Seamanship  --  --  3.4  4.1* 
     (2.3)  (2.4) 
Relative Navigation  --  --  5.2**  5.8** 
   (2.5)  (2.7) 
Relative Ordnance  --  --  -0.3  -0.9 
     (2.8)  (2.9) 
Engineer (dummy)  -2.7**  -3.7**  --  -- 
 (1.3)  (1.6)     
        
Dies in service   -10.9***  -11.6***  -11.3***  -12.1*** 
(dummy) (1.2)  (1.2)  (1.4)  (1.5) 
        
pseudo R – squared  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03 
        
Number of Obs.  1901  1761  1359  1289 
        
Number of Right   986  961  783  777 
Censored Obs.         
        
 
Dependent variable is number of years of naval officer’s career (up to 1907). 
Constant and class dummies not reported. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by  
***, **, and *, respectively. VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 27
Tables 2 and 3 present our rst set of results. We see in Table 2,
which includes all personnel, that line ocers with greater engineering
skill leave early, while those with navigation and seamanship skill stay
longer. This makes sense, since engineering skill was likely to be far
more transferable to other industries than seamanship or navigation.
We also see that overall merit has a strong positive eect on duration
of service.
One complication here however is that the Personnel Act of 1882
forced the navy to discharge many midshipmen throughout the 1880s;
further, as we mention in the previous section, this decision was made
primarily on the basis of overall merit. This creates a great many num-
ber of small observations for the dependent variable and overestimates
the eects of \Overall Relative Merit." In order to deal with this, we
rerun the same specication, but limit our observations only to those
who serve at least for three years. These classes would not have been
directly aected by the Personnel Act.17 Results are reported in Table
3. Coecients for Overall Relative Merit fall to insignicance. Thus
it appears that overall standing at the Naval Academy helps an ocer
survive his rst few years in the Navy, but does not appear to matter
much thereafter. Also, now we observe a statistically signicant neg-
ative eect on duration for both extensive and intensive measures of
engineering skill. The more technically gifted ocers tended to leave
the service a good few years ahead of the rest.
4.2. Human capital eects on earnings. Next, we regress the logged
earnings ocers received over a certain interval of their careers on indi-
vidual measures of education obtained at the Naval Academy and ship
experience from past naval service. These are regressions (3) and (4).
We consider year r the rst year of their earnings history, and year s
the last year of this history. Specically, Table 4 has r = 3 and s = 7,
so that we estimate the eects of education and the rst two years of
experience on ve years worth of earnings. Table 5 sets r = 3 and
17When we do this we lose around 400 observations.28 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
Table 4. OLS and Heckit Estimates of Eects of Edu-





  1 2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Overall Relative  0.08***  --  --  0.06**  0.08***  --  --  0.07*** 
Merit (0.012)      (0.03)  (0.01)      (0.02) 
                
First Year Relative  --  0.07***  --  --  --  0.08***  --  -- 
Merit   (0.011)        (0.012)     
                
Relative Steam  --  --  0.05***  0.04**  --  --  0.096***  0.045** 
     (0.02)  (0.02)      (0.01)  (0.02) 
Relative Seamanship --  --  0.015  0.002  --  --  --  -- 
     (0.02)  (0.02)         
Relative Navigation  --  --  0.03  0.01  --  --  --  -- 
     (0.02)  (0.02)         
Relative Ordnance  --  --  0.014  -0.004  --  --  --  -- 
     (0.02)  (0.02)         
                
Cum. Ship Exp.  -0.09***  -0.09***  -0.075*** -0.088***  -0.085*** -0.092***  -0.088*** -0.085***
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.015)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cum.  Sea  Exp.  -0.005  -0.001  0.0002 -0.0003  -0.005 -0.001 0.0008 0.0009 
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
                
Engineer (dummy)  0.27***  0.3***  --  --  0.26***  0.29***  --  -- 
 (0.02)  (0.02)      (0.01)  (0.01)     
Mills  --  --  --  --  0.027 0.055 0.048 0.069 
         (0.048)  (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.049) 
                
Number of Obs.  1385  1276  964  964  2361  2191  1759  1759 
Number of   --  --  --  --  976  915  795  795 
   Censored Obs.                 
R – squared  0.82  0.82  0.86  0.87  --  --  --  -- 
                
OLS Estimates  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No  No 
Heckit Estimates   No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                
                
Dependent variable is the logged sum of annual earnings from year 3 to year 7 of naval officer’s career. 
OLS estimates include only observations on those officers who serve for at least 7 years. 
Constant and class dummies not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.  Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%  
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 29
Figure 4. OLS and Heckit Estimates of Eects of Over-
all Merit Scores on 5-Year Earnings for Varying Values






















































Heckit Estimates of 4-year Order of Merit  
on Earnings - Table 4, Regression 5 
OLS Estimates of 4-year Order of Merit  
on Earnings - Table 4, Regression 1 
OLS Estimates of First-Year Order of Merit 
on Earnings - Table 4, Regression 2 
Heckit Estimates of First-Year Order of Merit 
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Figure 5. OLS and Heckit Estimates of Eects of En-



























































OLS Estimates of Engineering Dummy on 
Earnings - Table 4, Regression 2 
Heckit Estimates of Engineering Dummy 
on Earnings - Table 4, Regression 6 
OLS Estimates of Relative “Steam” Scores 
on Earnings - Table 4, Regression 4 
Heckit Estimates of Relative “Steam” 
Scores on Earnings - Table 4, Regression 8 
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Table 5. OLS and Heckit Estimates of Eects of Edu-





  1  2  3 4  5 6 7 8 
Overall Relative  0.07***  --  --  0.06*** 0.08***  --  --  0.06*** 
Merit (0.01)      (0.02)  (0.01)      (0.02) 
                
First Year Relative  --  0.06***  --  --  --  0.06***  --  -- 
Merit   (0.01)        (0.01)     
                
Relative Steam  --  --  0.05***  0.037**  -- -- 0.08***  0.037** 
     (0.014)  (0.016)      (0.01)  (0.016) 
Relative  Seamanship --  --  0.01  -0.000  -- -- -- -- 
     (0.01)  (0.006)         
Relative  Navigation  --  --  0.02  0.01  -- -- -- -- 
     (0.02)  (0.02)         
Relative  Ordnance  --  --  0.006  -0.01  -- -- -- -- 
     (0.02)  (0.02)         
                
Cum. Ship Exp.  -0.03*** -0.03***  -0.028**  -0.027**  -0.01 -0.015  -0.025** -0.022** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Cum. Sea Exp.  -0.008  -0.004  -0.001  -0.001  -0.007  -0.002  0.0003  0.0001 
  (0.006)  (0.01) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
                
Engineer (dummy)  0.22*** 0.28***  --  --  0.21*** 0.26*** --  -- 
  (0.02) (0.02)     (0.014) (0.017)    
Mills --  --  --  --  0.100**  0.113***  0.043  0.051 
         (0.04)  (0.04) (0.035) (0.034) 
                
Number  of  Obs.  1015  927 711  711  2361 2191 1759 1759 
Number  of    --  --  --  --  1346 1264 1048 1048 
   Censored Obs.                 
R – squared  0.88  0.88  0.85  0.85  -- -- -- -- 
                
OLS  Estimates  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes No No No No 
Heckit Estimates   No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
                
                
Dependent variable is the logged sum of annual earnings from year 3 to year 12 of naval officer’s career. 
OLS estimates include only observations on those officers who serve for at least 12 years. 
Constant and class dummies not reported. Standard errors in parentheses.  Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%  
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
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Figure 6. OLS and Heckit Estimates of Eects of Over-
all Merit Scores on 10-Year Earnings for Varying Values

























































Heckit Estimates of 4-year Order of Merit  
on Earnings - Table 5, Regression 5 
OLS Estimates of 4-year Order of Merit  
on Earnings - Table 5, Regression 1 
OLS Estimates of First-Year Order of Merit 
on Earnings - Table 5, Regression 2 
Heckit Estimates of First-Year Order of Merit 
on Earnings - Table 5, Regression 6 
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Figure 7. OLS and Heckit Estimates of Eects of En-
gineering Skill on 10-Year Earnings for Varying Values




















































OLS Estimates of Engineering Dummy on 
Earnings - Table 5, Regression 2 
Heckit Estimates of Engineering Dummy 
on Earnings - Table 5, Regression 6 
OLS Estimates of Relative “Steam” Scores 
on Earnings - Table 5, Regression 4 
Heckit Estimates of Relative “Steam” 
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s = 12, so that we estimate the eects of education and the rst two
years of experience on ten years worth of earnings.
Note that for these results we only include ocers who lasted at
least s years in the service (so that we always measure s years worth of
earnings for each ocer). This however creates a selection bias, so we
alternatively produce Heckit estimates (shown in (7) and (8)). Both
tables include both OLS and Heckit estimates.
Our proxy for general education, Overall Relative Merit, consistently
shows up as positive and signicant. We can see from our 5-year mea-
sures that someone who graduates from the top of his class is predicted
to earn roughly 6% to 8% more over a 5 year stretch of time compared
to someone who graduates at the bottom of his class. First year relative
merit, arguably a better gauge of innate general intelligence, seems to
echo this.
We also include subject specic ability measures. Engineering ability,
as captured by scores in \steam" classes, pay a premium early in one's
career. Strikingly, someone graduating at the top of their class in
engineering makes somewhere between 4 to 10% more than someone
at the bottom of the class over a 5-year period (depending on the
specication). This result compares similarly to the eect of overall
order of merit.18 Interestingly, \steam" performance is the only specic
subject that generates a measurable premia for line ocers.19
We can also see that engineer ocers were paid a sizable premium;
they received around 25 to 30% more over 5 years relative to line of-
cers. Note that while most historical studies of skill-premia can not
control for innate ability, we can do so here. Specically, we include
rst-year relative merit scores, which compare all the ocers together.
18Not included are other subject areas, such as Physical Science, Political Science
and Foreign Languages. None of these came in as statistically signicant or altered
any of the other results.
19We also try each specic subject one by one; the other subjects do not show
any signi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This also addresses another selection issue - the possibility that engi-
neer ocers were just smarter than regular line ocers. We account
for this in specications 2 and 6 (which test this extensive measure
of skill), which include the rst-year order of merit as an additional
explanatory variable.
OLS estimates limit the analysis only to those who serve a certain
number of years in order to directly compare ocers with varying
degrees of skill. This misses those ocers who leave the service be-
fore these end points. Early \retirement" from the navy may happen
for a variety of reasons, including dismissal, resignation, desertion, or
death.20 Many also leave the service before truly serving. These early
exiting midshipmen typically serve two years aboard naval vessels or
serve in other stations, and then leave before getting promoted to en-
sign; ignoring these ocers invites selection bias. Specications 5-8
use a Heckit estimator to control for this sample selection, but overall
ndings do not change noticeably and remain robust to the alternative
econometric specication.
4.3. Extent of skill depreciation. This gives us a sense of the mag-
nitude of skill premia, both for more general skills and engineering skills
(intensively and extensively measured). However, this gives us only a
snapshot: to gauge the extent of skill-depreciation, we need to look at
how these relationships change over the course the ocers' careers. To
do this we simply increase r and s by yearly increments, and re-run all
specications. What we nd is that all skill-premia decline over the
course of one's career. Figures 4 through 7 display these results (for
both 5 and 10 year stretches of earnings).21
20While the navy registers do distinguish between those who \resign" and those
who are \dismissed," it is dicult to get an accurate feel for who precisely left the
service voluntarily, and who were truly forced out. Because of this uncertainly, we
treat both situations as cases of early retirement due to issues of compatibility. We
do however control for cases where the ocer dies within the allocated time.
21For example: notice how s r 1 = 5 for gures 4 and 5, while s r 1 = 10
for gures 6 and 7.36 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
Arguably \general" skills tend to hold up better than engineering
skill. For example, Figure 4 depicts how the estimated earnings eects
from 4-year order of merit and rst-year order of merit evolve over
the course of one's career - these we can consider more general skills.
Figure 5 on the other hand depicts how the eects on earnings from
the extensive skill measure (engineering ocer or not) and the intensive
skill measure (steam scores for regular cadets) of engineering skill evolve
over one's career - these we can consider more specic technical skills.
Over the course of 25 years, the 5-year earnings premium from 4-year
merit scores fall from 8% to 2%. Engineers, on the other hand, go
from enjoying a huge 30% premium to roughly a 2-3% premium over a
similar period of time. And line ocers who score at the top of their
class in engineering earn roughly a 5% premium at the start of their
careers but end up earning a negative return after twenty years or so
(although this nding is not statistically signicant). Also note that
from peak to trough, most estimates are statistically dierent (that is,
the bottom errors at the peaks are typically higher than the top errors
at the trough). The point here is simply that those with engineering
ability tend to lose their superior earnings power more rapidly than
those with general ability, suggesting perhaps that changes in the Navy
eroded the relevance of some of those technical skills.
Finally, we regress a variety of \experience" measures on relative
merit and an engineer ocer dummy. These experience measures are
meant to capture the extent to which ocers served aboard war vessels
during their careers. Results are posted in Table 6. The rst set
of results use the number of years aboard any ship as the dependent
variable; the bottom set of results use the number of years aboard
active vessels (those out to sea) as the dependent variable.
Whichever way we measure \ship experience," ability appears ro-
bustly negative.
22 It appears then that those with less general ability
22Performance in specic subjects had no statistically signicant eects on
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Table 6. OLS Estimates of Eects of Skill and Ability





  1 2  3 
Overall Relative Merit  -0.29*** -0.68***  -1.32*** 
 (0.1)  (0.21)  (0.48) 
First Year Relative Merit  -0.28***  -0.86***  -0.83* 
 (0.1)  (0.2)  (0.44) 
Engineer (dummy)  -0.35***  -0.9***  -1.99*** 
 (0.1)  (0.17)  (0.65) 
      
R - squared  0.42  0.47  0.37 
      
Number of Obs.  1421  1031  524 
 
Dependent variables are number of years officers spend aboard naval vessels out  
of the first (1) five, (2) ten, and (3) twenty years of officers’ careers.  
Constant and class dummies not reported.   
Standard errors in parentheses.  Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by  
***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
 
  1 2  3 
Overall Relative Merit  -0.21  -0.2  -0.73 
 (0.14)  (0.23)  (0.47) 
First Year Relative Merit  -0.33***  -0.45**  0.12 
 (0.13)  (0.22)  (0.44) 
Engineer (dummy)  0.16  0.21  -1.1* 
 (0.11)  (0.18)  (0.57) 
      
R - squared  0.26  0.20  0.19 
      
Number of Obs.  1421  1031  524 
 
Dependent variables are number of years officers spend aboard naval vessels  
that are in active duty out of the first (1) five, (2) ten, and (3) twenty years of  
officers’ careers.  Constant and class dummies not reported. Standard errors  
in parentheses.  Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by ***, **,  
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Table 7. LOGIT Estimates of Eects of Ability and






  1 2  3  4 
Overall Relative Merit  0.71***  -0.21  0.85  1.3 
 (0.24)  (0.63) (0.59)  (0.9) 
First Year Relative Merit  -0.41*  -0.37  -1.2**  -0.61 
 (0.24)  (0.58) (0.54)  (0.9) 
        
Years spent on vessels  --  0.29***  0.11*  0.1* 
   (0.11)  (0.055)  (0.6) 
        
pseudo R - squared  0.16  0.14  0.15  0.22 
        
Number of Obs.  2182  668  479  182 
 
 
Dependent variable equals 1 if the officer had obtained command of a vessel: 
1 – ever in his career 
2 – during the first 10 years of his career, provided he was in the service during that period 
3 – during the first 20 years of his career, provided he was in the service during that period 
4 – during the first 30 years of his career, provided he was in the service during that period 
“Years spent on vessels” equals the number of years aboard naval ships: 
2 – out of 10 years 
3 – out of 20 years 
4 – out of 30 years 
Constant and class dummies not reported. 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% indicated by ***, **,  
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served aboard vessels with greater propensity, and served on more ac-
tive and larger vessels with even greater propensity. Indeed, the eect
appears to strengthen for those who serve longer. Contrary to what
many would perhaps expect, the navy did not match those with high
levels of human capital to naval ships. Those with the best general hu-
man capital instead tended to work in various oce positions on shore
- these included the dierent bureaus (steam engineering, ordnance,
navigation, and so forth), hydrographic oces, torpedo stations and
naval yards, and even the Naval Academy and War College. General
ability meant that ocers could get promoted to managerial oce roles
fairly quickly, away from naval vessels and sea duty. Perhaps it was
the ocer managing a bureau on shore that would need a great deal of
general skill to cope with the various technological and organizational
changes the navy was experiencing.
This idea is further explored by looking at those ocers who end up
commanding a vessel. To do this we run a LOGIT specication, where
the dependent variable equals one if the ocer ends up in command of
a ship during a certain period of his career, and zero if not. We report
results in Table 7.
When we look at all ocers (the rst specication), overall relative
merit seems to positively predict the obtainment of command; however,
this is only because general skill allows one to stay in the navy longer,
and this obviously would increase one's chance of getting command.
When we look at just those ocers who are in the service for com-
parable periods of time (the second to fourth specications), relative
merit falls to insignicance. Furthermore, rst year relative merit often
comes in weakly negative, suggesting that those of lesser general apti-
tude obtained command with greater propensity! The best predictor
of whether one will ultimately command a ship is simply the degree of
experience one has with ships. As it happens, those with a great deal
of ship experience tended to have lower merit scores.40 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
5. Conclusion
This paper suggests that the rate of return on education deteriorated
over time for U.S. naval ocers during the 19th century. Using archival
data, we empirically document that the value of the marginal product
of \skilled" workers converged to the value of the marginal product
of lesser-skilled workers over time, suggesting that human capital de-
preciated over time. This is somewhat surprising: the 2nd Industrial
Revolution is considered to be a more skill-biased one, and naval tech-
nological change was considered to be particularly skill-biased. But the
nature and structure of the industry was such that the rewards to one's
education petered out, inducing some to leave the industry. This was
probably exacerbated by the GPT nature of changes in the Navy (al-
though we can not isolate that eect from other factors). This should
perhaps serve as a cautionary tale, both to managers of skilled individ-
uals, and to the skilled individuals themselves. Industries with lots of
technological transition may dampen the value of the marginal product
of skilled workers; skilled workers may nd themselves relatively worse
o over time, and the industry may ultimately see an exodus of these
skilled individuals as they search for better opportunities elsewhere.
The lessons drawn from this industry-specic study help us under-
stand how technological change interacted with human capital more
generally in the late 19th century. During the second Industrial Revolu-
tion many innovations occurred in industries such as chemicals, electric-
ity, and steel. This created a new class of technician and perhaps under-
mined skills accumulated for older outmoded techniques. Economists'
understanding of this period has generally been limited by the lack of
individual-level data. With the compilation of this archival, industry-
specic data, we attempt to ll this gap in the literature. Our analysis
suggests that technical skill paid a sizable premium early in careers but
the premium diminishes as technical changes eroded the relevance of
technical skills.VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 41
References
Aghion, Philippe, and Peter Howitt. 1998. Endogenous Growth Theory.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Albion, Robert G. 1980. Makers of Naval Policy 1798-1947. Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press.
Aldrich, Terry M. 1970. \Rates of Return Earned on Investment in Formal
Technical Education in the Ante-Bellum American Economy." Journal of
Economic History. 30: 251-55.
Bartel, Ann, and Frank Lichtenberg. 1987. \The Comparative Advantage
of Educated Workers in Implementing New Technologies." Review of
Economics and Statistics. 69: 1-11.
Becker, Gary S., and Kevin M. Murphy. 2007. \Education and Consump-
tion: The Eects of Education in the Household Compared to the Mar-
ketplace." Journal of Human Capital. 1: 9{35.
Bennett, Frank M. 1896. The Steam Navy of the United States - A History
of the Growth of the Steam Vessel of War in the Navy, and of the Naval
Engineer Corps. Pittsburgh, Pa: Warren Co. Publishers.
Buhl, Lance C. 1974. \Marines and Machines: Resistance to Technological
Change in the American Navy, 1865-1869." Journal of American History
59: 703{27.
Calvert, Monte A. 1967. The Mechanical Engineer in America, 1830-1910:
Professional Cultures in Con
ict. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Coletta, Paolo E. 1987. A Survey of U.S. Naval Aairs, 1865-1917. London:
University Press of America.
Davis, Lance E., and Stanley L. Engerman. 2006. Naval blockades in peace
and war : an economic history since 1750. Cambridge; New York: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Galor, Oded. 2009. Unied Growth Theory. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press.42 VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY
Galor, Oded and Omer Moav. 2000. \Ability-Biased Technological Change,
Wage Inequality and Economic Growth." Quarterly Journal of Econom-
ics. 115: 469-498.
Galor, Oded and David Weil. 2000. \Population, Technology, and Growth:
From the Malthusian Regime to the Demographic Transition and Be-
yond." American Economic Review 90: 806-828.
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence Katz. 1998. \The Origins of Technology-
Skill Complementarity." Quarterly Journal of Economics. 113: 693-732.
Goldin, Claudia, and Lawrence Katz. 2000. \Education and Income in
the Early Twentieth Century: Evidence from the Prairies." Journal of
Economic History. 60: 782-818.
Griliches, Zvi. 1959. \Capital-Skill Complementarity." Review of Econom-
ics and Statistics, 51: 465-468.
Heckman, James. 1976. \Sample Selection Bias as a Specication Error."
Econometrica, 47: 153-161.
O'Brien, Phillips Payson. 2001. Introduction to Technology and Naval Com-
bat in the Twentieth Century and Beyond. London and Portland, OR:
Frank Cass Publishers.
Krueger, Dirk, and Krishna B. Kumar. 2004. \Skill Specic Rather Than
General Education: A Reason for US-Europe Growth Dierences?" Jour-
nal of Economic Growth. 9: 167{207.
Krusell, Per, Lee Ohanian, Victor Rios-Rull, and Giovanni Violante. 2000.
\Capital-Skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Anal-
ysis." Econometrica 68: 1029-53.
McBride, William M. 1992. \Strategic Determinism in Technology Selection:
The Electric Battleship nd US Naval-Industrial Relations." Technology
and Culture. 33: 248{77.
McBride, William M. 2000. Technological Change and the United States
Navy, 1865-1945. Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Mokyr, Joel, and the American Council of Learned Societies. 1990. The
Lever of Riches. New York: Oxford University Press.VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL - EVIDENCE FROM U.S. NAVY 43
Mokyr, Joel. 2002. The Gifts of Athena: Historical Origins of the Knowl-
edge Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Morison, Elting. 1966. Men, Machines, and Modern Times. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Nelson, Richard R., and Edmund S. Phelps. \Investment in Humans, Tech-
nological Diusion, and Economic Growth." The American Economic
Review. 56: 69{75.
O'Rouke, Kevin, Ahmed S. Rahman and Alan M. Taylor. 2008. \Luddites
and the Demographic Transition." NBER Working Paper 14484.
Roberts, William H. 2002. Civil War Ironclads: The U.S. Navy and In-
dustrial Mobilization. Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University
Press.
Scott, William. 1986. The Navy in the Doldrums: The In
uence of Politics
and Technology on the Decline and Rejuvenation of the American Fleet,
1866-1886. Unpublished manuscript.
Sweetman, Jack. 1979. The U.S. Naval Academy: An Illustrated History.
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
Sweetman, Jack. 1984. American Naval History: An Illustrated Chronology.
Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
Welch, Fins. \Education in Production." Journal of Political Economy.
101: 443{72.